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THE IMPLICATIONS OF DEVASTATING CONDITIONS IN REFUGEE CAMPS ON THE EUROPEAN MIGRATION CRISIS

This paper provides a comprehensive overview of the devastating conditions in refugee camps in the Middle-East and their contribution to the European refugee crisis. The selection of case studies includes refugee camps in Lebanon, Turkey, and Jordan, which are the major host countries for Syrian refugees, since the civil war in Syria began in 2011. Every case is analyzed by factors of accommodation, nutrition, and health care. Furthermore, the funding requirements of these camps are also taken into consideration. While Turkey was able to handle the migration movements mainly from Syria much more efficiently than Lebanon and Jordan, the other countries were completely overwhelmed by the crisis and the international community did not provide sufficient funding in order to support these two states. Earlier anticipation of the crisis could have prevented the mass migration movement from Syria to Europe, which started mainly in 2015 and remains still one of the major issues in European policy. The findings of this article show that providing proper accommodation, nutrition, and health care locally in the respective camps gives people incentives to stay in the region and not flee to Europe. In any case, a new development strategy for refugee camps in general is required.

1. INTRODUCTION

Europe has experienced decades of wars and the creation of the European Union brought the continent a period of peace and wealth. Now, in the year 2018, the EU is in a great crisis. The current migration crisis is probably the major issue to be addressed in coming years and the EU is struggling to find a solution for this problem. The current crisis is an identity crisis for the entire EU. No other example than the current refugee crisis shows the discrepancy within the EU member states so obviously. On the one hand, there are states, which are willing to accept refugees like Germany or Sweden. On the other hand, there are states, which do not accept any refugee like the countries of the “Visegrad Group”.

The current state of science concerning migration theories mainly focuses on the classic push and pull theory by Lee (1966), which describes the factors: why people leave (push) their country and why people migrate to others (pull). Indeed, this model is still one of most important works in this field and the basis for newer models, like ‘push-pull plus’ which introduces some other dimensions as well as identifying new drivers of migration. Furthermore, this article introduces works which have been dealing with the issue of refugees in camps and what impact devastating conditions have had on their lives. Nevertheless, the issue of refugee camps is only barely covered

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by the literature. For that purpose, this paper provides its own 'push-stay-pull' model. Because refugee camps are an extraordinary situation, in these circumstances the 'pull factor' cannot be really applied here and going back to the area of origin is also not an option.

Hence, this paper will analyze the situation of primarily Syrians in refugee camps and its implications in the European migration crisis and will emphasize the need for further research in this field. Syria plays an undoubtedly extraordinary role in the current European refugee crisis since Syria is the country of origin for most immigrants (5.4 million people) fleeing from war and 700,000 of them living in Germany. (BIM 2016) For that reason, the situation in refugee camps located in the neighborhood of Syria is relevant and will be analyzed by the example of the three primary countries hosting Syrian refugees: Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan. All the refugee camps in these countries are permanently struggling with obtaining funding from the international community. However, while Turkey is doing relatively well, the situation in Lebanon and Jordan remains devastating. As a consequence, these two countries suffer most from development problems and cannot provide sufficient supplies to people in camps. The paper tries to provide an answer to this question: how does the devastating situation in refugee camps (including undernourishment, poverty, disease, etc.) affect the current European migration crisis? The aim of this paper is to analyze migration and refugee movements as a consequence of the miserable and inhuman conditions in refugee camps in the Middle-East and the subsequent impact on the European migration crisis beginning in 2015. This paper will mainly focus on the consequences of poverty and hunger, and the inadequate health care systems in refugee camps. Other migration drivers, like limited access to education will be also taken into consideration. The hypothesis of the paper is that people would not flee to Europe in significant numbers if the situation in refugee camps in the Middle-East was reasonably livable. This article also pays attention to the counterargument that people without money cannot flee. In conclusion, the paper starts with the context part explaining the cases of the three top hosting countries, followed by a literature review, including an extended model for explaining the unique situation in migration theories. The last part of the paper is the discussion, which also tries to provide some recommendations and solutions for the devastating situation in refugee camps.

2. THE SITUATION IN REFUGEE CAMPS AROUND SYRIA (LEBANON, TURKEY & JORDAN)

2.1 THE CASE OF LEBANON

According to the UNHCR there are currently (2017) 1,001,051 registered Syrian refugees living in Lebanon. (UNHCR 2017) In comparison to the year 2015 with 1,150,000 Syrian refugees, the number has not significantly decreased. (Amnesty International 2015) However, the real number is probably tremendously higher. For instance, SPIEGEL ONLINE reported in the year 2015 that Lebanon is hosting approximately 2 million Syrian refugees in a country with a population of 4.5 million inhabitants. (Salloum 2015) Every fifth person in Lebanon is a refugee, which makes Lebanon, per capita, the biggest host country for refugees in the world. (Rainey 2015)

The state of Lebanon changed its migration policy in the year 2015. Since then, the UHNCR is not allowed to register any Syrian refugees. Thus, the Lebanese state is incapable of hosting such a huge amount of fleeing people and to provide them sufficient food, water, health care, etc.

The UN reported as early as December 2015 that “some 70 per cent of the over 1 million Syrian refugees in Lebanon now live below the Lebanese extreme poverty line”. (UN 2015) Private organizations and institutions like Women Now or Sawa for Syria have assumed the role of the state and built their own refugee camps in Lebanon. (Molter 2016) These organizations depend on donations, exactly the same as the UHNCR does. Despite worldwide financial support, the funding of these help organizations is constantly wanting. For example, the UHNCR has only covered 30% of its 2 billion USD funding requirements (November 2017). (UHNCR 2017) Furthermore, most of the refugee camps are not official camps, but only tolerated by the Lebanon state. Private owners of land are letting some of their ground for the establishment of refugee camps. The price for one family per month is usually 100 USD – just for the allowance to set up a tent. For a family, which has lost everything in war, this is a huge amount of money, and they still need nutrition and clean water. (Molter 2016)

Molter (2016) reported from Bekaa, where approximately 1 million Syrian refugees (temporarily) live in refugee camps, that the camp administration is able to provide enough food and clean water. Nevertheless, the situation can change instantly and everything else is in peril. For instance, because of limited classroom capacity only 30% of 400,000 Syrian refugee children are able to attend school. Many children have to work in order to support their families financially. Therefore, child labor is pretty common, as is prostitution. The UHNCR can only provide 13 USD per month for one family and because of funding issues the trend is negative. Thus, the UN refugee organization is not really a big help. Many of the help organizations themselves are migrating to Turkey because the registration of their work is easier there. (Molter 2016)

Concerning health care, Lebanon did have proper infrastructure, including 165 hospitals, 158 primary health care centers and well-educated employees in 2013. Overall, the basic health system of Lebanon was functional, but also costly, before the crisis intensified in 2015. Regardless, the more prevalent, chronic, non-communicable health care needs made the country struggle. Lebanon was already over allocated during that time since the country had to host Palestine refugees as well. One of major challenges is to provide long-term support, while after natural disasters only emergency help is required. (El-Khatib, Scales, Vearey & Forsberg 2013) Thus, Lebanon was not able to fulfill all these requirements anymore, and, consequently, the outbreak of leishmaniasis occurred in 2012. Saroufim (2014) concluded that “poverty, malnutrition, population displacement, weakened immunity, and poor housing are all risk factors for cutaneous leishmaniasis”. Additionally, Lebanon has a long tradition of distribution battles between refugees (mostly from Palestine) and the hosting community. According to Halabi (2004), the population in the camps competed for the scarce resources, including employment and housing. Palestinian traders did not have access to markets which surrounded the camp. The markets have been occupied mainly by Syrian traders and only outdated food products have been left for Palestinians. Furthermore, the outbreak of other conflicts in the ‘60s, lead to greater struggle over housing. The consequence was the establishment of illegal camps creating structures with high conflict potential. (Halabi 2004) This problem has never been solved and additionally shows some significant similarities to the current problems of refugee camps in Lebanon. The global community has already ignored the demand for help from Lebanon for decades, and by taking the underfunding of refugee camps into consideration still does.

2.2 THE CASE OF TURKEY

The total amount of registered Syrian refugees living in Turkey is 3,285,533 in 2017. (UNHCR 2017) In comparison to 2015 with 1.7 million Syrian refugees, the number of refugees has almost doubled. From the almost 2 million refugees in Turkey in 2015, 250,000 were living in one of the 25 refugee camps (the rest are spread across the country). The WFP was able to provide food and clean water for 154,000 people in 11 camps. (WFP 2015) According to the New York Times, in 2014 the refugee camps in Turkey were in pretty good condition. The Turkish government built at record speed container camps with at least minimum standards, including cleanliness, brand new brick paths, street-washing trucks, power lines, streetlights, housing maintenance and playgrounds for children. Furthermore, the camp in Kilis provided education for 2,225 students; sometimes at a higher standard than in the home school in Syria. (McClelland 2014) However, the situation outside the camps remained devastating. Many of the refugees were living on the streets or in shanties. In most cases, it is unknown where they lived. According to Onur Burçak Belli, a reporter from the FAZ and who observed the situation in Istanbul, Ankara, Adana and other Turkish cities, the standard of living for most Syrian refugees is much worse than in camps. She reported that children very often became the main income source for families. Indeed, child labor is not a new phenomenon in Turkey, but the level of exploitation was exceptional high since most Syrian children are traumatized and barely speak the Turkish language. Another issue was the rising tension within society because of the extraordinary high level of immigrants. (Topçu 2015)

The reason for the relatively high standard in Turkish refugee camps is not due to the efforts of the UNHCR, but due to Turkish state initiative. The Turkish government received guidelines (minimum distance between tents, etc.) from the UNHCR and then designed the camps on its own. This approach has the advantage that Turkey remains in control of every detail. Indeed, this procedure is cost-intensive, but also highly effective. While NGOs, who are usually running refugee camps, often have to deal with local bureaucracy, inefficient structures (many countries are involved) and insufficient funding, a relatively wealthy state can fulfill the requirements easily. (McClelland 2014) The actual figures concerning the UNHCR funding requirements in 2017 confirm this observation. For the year 2017, the UNHCR requires funding of around about 900 million USD for Turkey, which is not even half of the required funding for Lebanon, although significantly more refugees are living in Turkey than in Lebanon. Nevertheless, the UNHCR struggles to receive the necessary funds. At the moment (2017), the UNHCR only covers 37% of its funding requirements. (UNHCR 2017)

Prior to the current situation in Turkey, the Turkish government had anticipated the upcoming crisis much better than other countries and was respectively far better prepared. While Jordan or Lebanon have had to struggle with epidemics, diseases and other urgent health issues, Turkey managed to establish a well-functioning and highly-effective health care infrastructure in order to respond adequately to the mass migration from Syria. Indeed, the Turkish state is economically much stronger when compared to Lebanon and Jordan. Therefore, the funding was not such a big issue as in other countries. (Sahloul, Sankri-Tarbichi & Kherallah 2012)

Although, the Turkish state covers the basic needs of Syrian refugees in camps, there are, of course, also some criticisms like food poisoning, insufficient distribution of basic goods (e.g. soap or toothpaste), tents are not protecting from rain, insults from Turkish soldiers, etc. In

general, Özden (2013) had the impression that wealthier Syrians prefer to live outside the camps by renting apartments, while the not so wealthy stay in the camps. As a consequence, especially in Southern Turkey (close to the Syrian border) the costs of living and unemployment have increased which might lead to local conflicts between Syrians and Turks. (Cagaptay 2014) consequently, many of the Syrians are living in extreme poverty or becoming homeless after running out of money in a short period of time. Nevertheless, in comparison to 2012, the Turkish government has intensified its cooperation with international help organization, involving FAO, IOM, UNDP, UNFPA, UNHCR, and UNICEF in order to provide more assistance for refugee living inside and outside the camps. (Kirişç 2014) Nevertheless, Turkey was overwhelmed of the inflow of Syrian refugees. At the beginning of the crisis, almost all refugees lived in camps. By end of the year 2014, approximately 80 percent of Syrian refugees lived outside the camps, which shows that also the Turkish government had distribution struggles before the refugee crisis in Europe had broken out. İçduygu stresses that Turkey should not left alone to solve the crisis but only sharing of the burden by the international community can significantly improve the situation of Syrian refugees in Turkey. (İçduygu 2015)

2.3 THE CASE OF JORDAN

Jordan is the third country in this case study which is highly affected by refugee movements. According to the UNHCR, there are currently 654,877 Syrian refugees in Jordan. (November 2017) (UNHCR 2017) In comparison to the year 2015, the number of refugees (620,000; 84% in refugee camps) has slightly increased. (Francis 2015) Similar to Lebanon, the Jordan state fails to provide sufficient security for the immigrants. Even before the crisis in Syria, Jordan was struggling with massive economic and political instability. Therefore, the situation has dramatically worsened since 2015. The Jordan state is not able to provide proper accommodation for refugees since most of the people are living actually not in camps, but rather in “host communities”. Since 2014, the Jordan government has highly restricted access to the country for Syrian refugees because the Hashemite Kingdom feared national instability due to the growing number of refugees and camps along the border with Syria. Thus, the tensions between the UNHCR and the Jordan regime have started to rise. The problematic situation in Jordan makes it difficult for the UNHCR and other help organizations to improve the life of people in refugee camps. (Francis 2015)

Two years later, the dramatic situation in Jordan has not significantly changed. Musharbash (2017) claims that help organizations have only limited access to the “improvised” camps and are still incapable of providing enough support. In comparison to Turkey and Lebanon, tens of thousands of people (mostly children and women) have no access to clean water and food. Furthermore, terrorist attacks happen also regularly in the camps. There has been no support from help organizations since 2016. Consequently, diseases and child mortality have spread through the camps because of the lack of health care. At the beginning of year, there has was some small success concerning these issues, but the UNHCR is still many kilometers away and most of the emergency supplies could not be delivered due to distribution problems and bad weather. In addition to domestic policy issues and bad infrastructure in Jordan, the insecure situation in the camps is a major issue. Jordan estimates that 10 percent of the populations in its refugee camps are militant groups, including the IS. Another issue is a border dispute between Jordan and Syria which makes it difficult to determine which country the refugees are currently located in. (Mus-

harbash 2017). UN officials call this region “no-man’s-land”. The UNHCR funding requirement for 2017 is approximately 1.2 billion USD which is covered 42 percent. Thus, the coverage rate is, compared to Turkey and Lebanon, relatively high, but by taking the tremendously big problems of the country into consideration, it is still just a drop in the ocean. (UNHCR 2017)

Jordan has a long history of almost six decades with refugee camps since it is one of the major host countries for Palestine refugees. The unclear political situation makes it difficult, if not impossible, to implement a proper urbanization strategy for those camps. Nevertheless, due to the long hosting experience of the country, some of these camps have developed the character of small cities or towns. Indeed, many buildings, streets and housing opportunities have been improvised and do not provide proper accommodation, but there has been certainly some development of some basic infrastructure for inhabitants. (Tawil 2006) However, the Syrian refugee crisis exceeded the financial ability of Jordan to meet the requirements since Jordan was already incapable of managing the refugee movements from Palestine for decades. The Za’atari camp for instance, which is the biggest Jordanian refugee camp for Syrians, had already struggled in 2011 to provide enough food, sanitation and water. The registration process of Syrian refugees takes months. (El-Khatib, Scales, Vearey & Forsberg 2013) As a consequence of these bad conditions, some refugees even went back to Syria, or are living now in other (unregistered) improvised tenant camps spread over the country – without any access to nutrition or water. (Achilli 2015)

3. CURRENT STATE OF LITERATURE

In general, we can identify three dominant forms of migration: labor migrants, settler migrants, and refugees. Nevertheless, there are many other forms of migration, including family reunion, marriage migration, student migration, highly-skilled migration and brain drain, environmental and climate change migration, and human trafficking and sexual exploitation. (King 2012) Migration theory, as a science, has shifted to an interdisciplinary field of research, including the newest trends of globalization, economics, mobility, etc. The dominant analytical theme of recent time periods is the framing of international migration as a transnational process. According to King, the two most influential works in this field were *Towards a Transnational Perspective on Migration* (Glick Schiller et al. 1992) and *Nations Unbound* (Basch et al. 1994). Another important scholar is Portes (1999), who provides a substantial definition on transnationalism and migration ‘that take place on a recurrent basis across national borders and that require a regular and significant commitment of time by participants... These activities are not limited to economic enterprises [such as sending and receiving remittances or setting up a business ‘back home’], but include political, cultural and religious activities as well’.

Since it is not very likely that migration movements will stop in the future, there are some challenges to building a more comprehensive and reasonable theory concerning migration. The classic article from Lee (1966), which introduced the famous push-pull theory, is still one of the most sophisticated works in the field of migration studies. In this model, push describes the causes of flight, while pull examines the attractiveness of the destination by certain factors. Push factors are socio-economic (hunger, poverty, demographic issues, etc.), political (war, dictatorship, discrimination, etc.) and environmental (natural disasters, scarce resources, etc.) based. Thus, pull factors include the following aspects: economy (booming economy, higher income, social welfare-system, etc.), society (security, housing, education, etc.), demography (sufficient space,

social networks, infrastructure, etc.) and politics (freedom, rule of law, democracy, etc.). However, there are also some other thresholds and barriers which have to be passed before migration can occur between the country of origin and destination, such as (restrictive) immigration laws. Hence, by taking all the previously described factors into consideration, migration will very likely occur, when the destination offers significantly more advantages than the country of origin. Arango (2004) asks the question the way other around: why do people stay in their country of origin? According to the classical “push (why people leave an area) and pull (why people move to a particular area) factors”, he suggests adding another pair: retain and repel, which reflects the social, family and cultural structures at micro- and meso-scales. (King 2012)

The latest works in the field of migration studies have extended the classic push-pull theory by identifying and adding new drivers of migration to the model. An example of this expansion is Nicholas Van Hear, Oliver Bakewell and Katy Long with their article “Push-pull plus: reconsidering drivers of migration” (2017). According to the authors, migration flows can be understood by taking the following categories into consideration: predisposing (structural disparities between origin and destination on the bases of macro-political-economy), proximate (direct bearing effects on migration, e.g. down- or upturn in economic), precipitating (outbreak of war, natural disasters, collapse of social welfare systems, etc.) and mediating drivers (presence or absence of infrastructure, communication, information). The decision whether one person decides to leave or to stay depends on the combination and the actual importance of these factors. The complexity of this model is to distinguish and evaluate between important and less important circumstances. Nevertheless, the authors conclude that proximate and mediating drivers show greater potential for intervention than structural and precipitating spheres. Furthermore, the authors identified some other dimensions of drivers, like locality (e.g. demographic or environmental pressures), scale (different social and geographical scales), duration or timeframe (different timescales from sudden to acute to chronic), and depth or tractability (drivers on the surface of society and hidden drivers). Again, the combination of these drivers is crucial in determining if migration happens or not. All these factors should not be considered in isolation, but rather in concert. (Van Hear, Bakewell, Long 2012 & 2017)

Overall, the push-pull theory is probably the most comprehensive approach in migration studies. However, the theory is focused more on permanent settlement, or long-term migration, while refugee camps are supposed to be a short-term solution. Indeed, Everett, who came up first with this model, has included “obstacles for migration” in his theory, but he is not dealing with the issue of people who are forced to flee for serious reasons (e.g. war), - respectively people, who are pushed away from their country of origin – and are not able to overcome these obstacles in order to migrate to another country, nor can they go back to their country of origin. The pull factor does not exist here, since the only appealing reason for fleeing is security. Of course, security is the major human demand, but, nevertheless, it does not satisfy any other basic human needs. Therefore, the push factor remains tremendously high while security is the only pull factor; a factor, which should be not taken into consideration at all, if it is the only reason for leaving an area, since it is natural that no rational (civilian) person wants to risk its life in armed conflicts. In this case, people are locked in no-man’s-land, respectively in camps or transit zones. Consequently, people are just pushed farther, or in other words, people will continuously seek alternative living and survival situations. The theory is based on the thinking that people are migrating from one country to another, which is initially true. Nevertheless, the reality is that people are mostly

fleeing from *one country to camps or transit zones*, which makes a big difference. While countries are following migration policies and trying to control the in- and outflow of migrants and citizens, camps are improvised solutions, often run by international institutions. Furthermore, although camps are mainly outside of the country where the armed conflict takes place, they are in fact small complex socio-microeconomics for themselves and often referred as “a state in a state”. In particular, the examples of refugee camps in Lebanon and Jordan show that these states are completely overwhelmed by the big refugee movements from Syria and are not able to control their borders anymore. Thus, local governments in these neighboring countries are incapable of dealing with this situation properly, while camps are developing their own infrastructure and identity. In fact, extended versions of the push and pull model are now considering more drivers of migration, but the issues remain the same. Therefore, a more profound approach is required which considers short-term settlement, i.e., camps and transit zones, as an identifiable entity in the model. Additionally, this approach offers new opportunities in spatial planning as a part of urbanization processes because it can transform short-term into long-term sustainable solutions by satisfying basic needs (nutrition, fresh water, security etc.) and making cultural, political, and economic participation for its inhabitants possible. Therefore, the classic push-pull model could be added to by the factor “stay”, which is supposed to reduce the causes of flight. The following table illustrates this model:

	Push Factors	Stay Factors	Pull Factors
Push,- Stay,- and Pull Factors	Socio-economic Political Environmental	Satisfaction of Basic Human Needs Development Program / Urbanization Process Cultural, Political and Economic Participation Employment	Economy Society Demography Politics
Area	Country A	Transit-zone / Refugee Camp	Country B
Timeframe	Long-term / Short-term	Temporary with the Outlook for long-term	Long-term
Direction of Migration	→	With Obstacle (↓ ; →)	↓
	→	Without Obstacle (→)	↓

Table 1: Push-Stay-Pull Model

Another approach by Kaufmann (2004) emphasizes the social structures of mobility and migration. Since the world has become highly connected as part of the globalization process, it is very likely that this trend will continue in the future. Kaufmann calls it “the notion of mobility capital or motility”. Access to more mobility will increase the possibilities to travel, migrate, circulate, and return. (King 2012) However, not everybody will benefit from higher mobility. Mahler and Pessar (2006) have pointed out in their work that there is a gap between men and women concerning migration. The reason for this is patriarchal family structures which often lead to the effect that men migrate, but women stay at home. The current European refugee crisis is a good example of that. While the men are going to Europe, women often stay in the home country until men receive asylum and get the opportunity to let their family follow through legal processes. Additionally, men and women often have different reasons for migration. The last aspect is the

anthropological and cultural studies perspective. (Blunt 2007) Tony Fielding distinguishes in his studies between “stairway to heaven (migration as freedom, new beginnings, going places, opting out etc.) and rootlessness and sadness (migration as exile, displacement, rupture, sacrifice, failure, etc.) migration.” (King 2012) The stairway to heaven migration is becoming more and more important in the EU.

Since the war in Syria started – and therefore the so called ‘European Refugee Crisis’ as a consequence of this conflict– the attention of migration theories has also shifted to this issue. In fact, the neighboring countries of Syria are still the countries which are most affected by asylum-seeker movements – and not Europe. Thus, this development is also reflected in recent literature by taking the situation of people in refugee camps fleeing from armed conflicts in Syria under consideration. According to Berti (2015), the critical areas of intervention in refugee camps include protection, shelter, health and education, and employment. Those factors have to be fulfilled sufficiently in order to provide a proper standard of living to people. However, the situation is not only problematic for the people in refugee camps but is also a burden for the hosting country. The refugee crisis negatively affects social services and labor markets, housing, electricity, sanitation and water resources. Consequently, many poor countries suffer a fiscal deficit, international trade decreases and loss of tourism income. Overall, the whole infrastructure and welfare system (if one is existing) of a country are put under extreme pressure. These economic and political tensions lead to social tensions within society since distribution battles become more common. Another result is cultural conflicts, especially between groups which support different sides in the Syrian civil war. Therefore, massive refugee movements lead economic, political, environmental and security (food, health care, rising conflicts) instability. (Berti 2015)

Indeed, the debate concerning refugee camps is not new in the field of academics. Crisp and Jacobsen have given already some mentionable-worthy input to the debate in 1998 by indentifying constraints on implementing international standards in refugee camps. These limitations are environmental constraints (inhabitable living space), social constraints (refugees usually settle down close to their ethnic, cultural and linguistic preferences), political constraints (the government has the final decision over its refugee policy) and logistical and financial constraints (limited capacity and resources). Nevertheless, the authors argue that refugee camps are necessary to protect people from armed conflicts. Governments have to apply a more liberal asylum policy and humanitarian agencies like the UHNCR need more financial support to provide the highest possible supply of nutrition, basic materials and security. (Crisp & Jacobsen 1998) Regardless, even when all these requirements are fulfilled, it is not very likely that camps will suddenly be abolished. Refugee camps are complex socio-economical structures which develop their own urban infrastructure, character and identity. Thus, because of self-sustainability market towns will develop and refugees could refuse to go back to their country of origin by becoming permanent settlers. (De Montlocs & Kagwanja 2000)

Newer studies in this field of research mainly focus on the mental health and educational situation in camps. The work from Sirin and Sirin (2015) with the title “The Educational and Mental Health Needs of Syrian Refugee Children” stresses the especially terrible conditions for children in refugee camps. According to their study, Syrian refugee camps are at great risk for mental health problems which might affect their development negatively. Another issue is the inefficient and insufficient supply of high-quality education for these children. Both mental health care and education are essential parts of successful integration but the funding problems

in many host countries make it nearly impossible to meet these requirements. (Sirin & Sirin 2015) The study from Paardekooper, de Jong and Hermanns (1999), who analyzed the situation of South Sudanese children in refugee camps in Northern Uganda came to a similar conclusion. The vast majority of South Sudanese refugee children showed depressive symptoms and behavioral problems. In general, refugees more often have mental health issues compared to the host community and other groups of migrants. (Acarturk, Konuk, Cetinkaya, Senay, Sijbrandi, Cuijpers & Akter 2015) The Syrian civil war has demolished every health care system in the country and led to the spread of infections and epidemics like poliomyelitis, measles, and cutaneous leishmaniasis – not only in Syria, but also in its neighbor countries (especially in camps), because of high vulnerability of the Syrian population during the crisis. (Sharara & Kanji 2014) Consequently, it is not very likely or reasonable that people would prefer to stay in areas where they are denied health care since the situation in most camps remains devastating. Therefore, the push factors are increasing significantly and people are more likely to leave.

According to Toole, MF, DTM&H, Nieburg, MD, MPH, Waldman, MD, MPH (1988), who investigated in their article *“The Association Between Inadequate Rations, Undernutrition Prevalence, and Mortality in Refugee Camps: Case Studies of Refugee Populations in Eastern Thailand, 1979–1980, and Eastern Sudan, 1984–1985”* the situation of Tigrayan refugees in Eastern Sudan and Cambodian refugees in Thailand, stated out the importance of refugee camps in terms of nutrition supply. While the mortality rate for Cambodian refugees in camps has declined significantly, the mortality rate for Tigrayan refugees in camps remained extraordinary high. Especially young children (less than five years old) suffered from undernourishment. Furthermore, international relief agencies failed to distribute a sufficient amount of food to starving people. Thus, the authors concluded that anticipation of refugee movements is necessary in order to procure and organize enough nutrition.

The aforementioned case studies emphasize the importance of satisfying basic human needs like health care, nutrition, education, etc. Additionally, the political, economical, cultural and environmental situations should be also taken into consideration when analyzing refugee movements from camps, specifically why people do not stay there. On the other hand, it shows that providing livable conditions to people in camps can improve their situation or even eliminate the push factors for leaving. In conclusion, we can say that devastating conditions in refugee camps significantly increase the probability that people will continue to journey to other destinations. The “push-stay-pull” model implements a new dimension in the discussion and tries to provide a coherent approach to stop mass migration by making life for people in refugee camps reasonably livable in the long-run.

4. DISCUSSION

Overall, the literature concerning migration theories does cover all relevant parts from forced migration to labor migration with the exception of the unusual situation in refugee camps. Refugee camps are relatively new phenomena which appeared in the time after the Second World War. Nevertheless, it is not really part of the discussion in the field of migration theories. There are almost no studies which analyze the process of urbanization from camps. Most of new research in this field focuses on health care (epidemics, diseases, post-traumatic consequences etc.). The war in Syria shows that millions of refugees are living outside their country of origin in

temporary accommodations and the hosting states fail to provide sufficient security, health care and nourishment. Thus, private help organizations and institutions are replacing the functions of the actual states. Refugee camps are complex small to medium-size socio-economic systems. Some would even argue refugee camps are even states within a state; or, taking the devastating situation for most of the people in those camps into consideration, the term “failed” state seems to be also very reasonable. A very popular example for such a refugee camp is the Gaza Strip in the West Bank, which is, in name, part of the autonomous region of Palestine, but is, in fact, under the control of the Israeli state since Israel controls the movement of people, telecommunication, water and energy supply. Without a doubt, the Middle-East conflict is a very complex issue, and it will be not part of this paper, but it illustrates a possible development in the future of other refugee camps in the region, even when excluding the religious tensions of the Middle-East conflict, when a state – or other higher authority – is incapable of providing enough support. Concerning refugee camps, there is a lack of literature in the field of migration studies. Thus, there is further need for research in this minor field regarding circumstances in which people prefer to stay in camps rather than fleeing to Europe.

The importance of refugee camps is a factor in the current – and still not solved – European refugee crisis. The big migration movement from Syria and its neighbor countries started when the UNHCR and WFP were running out of money and were no longer able to provide enough food, clean water, and security to the people outside the camps. In an interview with *The Guardian* newspaper in Britain, the UN high commissioner for refugees, Antonio Guterres, formulated it in this way: “The budgets cannot be compared with the growth in need. Our income in 2015 will be around 10% less than in 2014. The global humanitarian community is not broken – as a whole they are more effective than ever before. But we are financially broke.” (*The Guardian* 2015) One of the major counter-arguments concerning this issue is that “the poorest of the poor” usually do not migrate due to a lack of (financial) resources, which are obligatory for migration. (UNDP 2009) Indeed, there has been also some discussion in the field of academics that development help may even have the contrary effect, since financial support from development help is providing these resources. (de Haas 2010) However, when analyzing the European refugee crisis, the issue is much more complex. First of all, major studies in this field are from 10 to 20 years old. In the meanwhile, the world has significantly changed. Nowadays, we live in the era of digitalization and, therefore, the forms of communication have transformed completely. Even in poor areas of the world, it is not rare for people to own mobile devices. When in 2015, Germany and other European countries opened their borders for asylum seekers, the message spread around the world even to the most outlying regions in the world. The incentive-effect of this message should be not underestimated. Infrastructure and mobility have made big steps forward in recent years. Whereas, in the 1990’s and 2000’s travelling around the world was very costly, it is nowadays relatively affordable with the emergence of low-cost no-frills airlines. The bigger issue remains here: not if the “poor of the poorest” can make it to Europe, but rather if they can get the right legal status and pay human traffickers to get them there.

The last part is what it makes so difficult and costly to reach their country of destination in Europe. The Dublin II agreement, which says people have to seek asylum in the country where they first enter European soil, is one of the reasons why it is and was so expensive to come to Europe since most asylum seekers prefer to go to Northern Europe (Germany, Benelux, Scandi-

navia, etc.). When in late-summer 2015, the Dublin II agreement became obsolete, this obstacle did not exist anymore.

Nevertheless, the situation concerning Syria remains very special. Before the outbreak of the civil war, the majority of the population had a relatively comfortable life. Thus, the country should be not considered as one of the “poorest of the poor”. At the beginning of the civil war in 2011, most people might have had still the illusion that the war would end soon and did not intend to go to Europe. However, many people lost everything when they had to flee, but a significant number of people had some financial resources. A survey from 2016 by the IAB found out that most of the refugees who came to Germany have been financing their flight by savings (39%) and by selling goods and property (34%). The costs vary significantly from the country of origin, but in general it was between 5.200 EUR (second half of year 2015) and 7.300 EUR (2013). (IAB 2016) According to this study, we can say that the costs were not the biggest problem on the way to Europe. At the same time, it is also not enough money to have a reasonable life elsewhere, especially not in the region of crisis, since distribution battle and scarce resources are also an issue (if there is no supply, money alone does not cover basic human needs like access to nutrition, food and education). The limitation of the work is that we cannot measure how much savings have been kept after fleeing to Europe. Furthermore, it is also worth to mention that the origin of the money is not always clear, like an inside report from the German news journal SPIEGEL ONLINE demonstrates. According to their report refugees sold organs (approximately 7.000 EUR average) because of financial problems. (Putz 2013) The amount of people, who did this in order to flee to Europe, remains unclear. Thus, further research is needed.

The case studies show that proper accommodation and sufficient supplies (like in Turkey) can weaken the crisis, if the funding requirements are fulfilled efficiently and NGOs do not have to do the whole work alone. However, refugee camps in their current form are not a final solution. Therefore, a new approach is needed. Migration theories, especially in the field of refugee camps have to focus more on the aspect of how to give people a perspective locally. Thus, huge investments are required in order to build up functional economics (including employment, trade, and infrastructure) and to transform refugee camps into livable areas, which provide housing, nutrition, water, etc. However, this transformation process can be only successful, if the legal status of the people is reconsidered, whether by integrating them in the host country, or by giving them a newly created citizenship, and people get the opportunity to participate in the society – politically and culturally. People need the right of self-determination about their lives and future. It is not very likely that people will ever integrate in a different society or start building up a new identity if they have the impression that other institutions or states are making decisions concerning them. In this context, self-empowerment is a very important factor which should be not underestimated. Thus, refugee camps need to become self-sustaining systems which can be run, in the long term, independently from financial help of international organizations, or other states.

Nevertheless, the work has some limitations. The whole European migration crisis is still a relatively new phenomenon and many numbers and figures are hard to evaluate because most of the countries are involved in armed conflicts, the propaganda machinery is running and none of these countries are democracies. Furthermore, the political situation can change overnight, like the example of Turkey and the failed coup from last year demonstrates. The recently published study about autocracy from Bertelsmann (2018) shows that not only Turkey, but also Lebanon

and Jordan, have left the way of democratization. Indeed, there is also the possibility that the civil war in Syria, respectively a proxy war, might stop overnight, and refugees will start going back to their country of origin, but this option is not very realistic. The situation remains very fragile and it can become even worse, if even more countries get involved in this conflict. Since most of the hosting countries have already reached their limits concerning hosting refugees, there is also the threat that distribution battles for the scarce resources will escalate and new conflicts between host community and refugees will emerge.

4.1 POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The role of refugee camps has to be reconsidered. The actual plan that refugee camps should be temporary solutions does not work anymore. Indeed, the case of Palestine refugees raises the question if it has ever worked sufficiently. The civil war in Syria started in 2011 and is still far from being resolved. Thus, the forced migration from this region needs to be stopped to give the refugees a local perspective. Refugee camps around Syria can be the solution if the world community is able to implement public assistance, create jobs and treat the camps as small micro-economies to allow them trade with other countries and regions. In order to achieve this goal, multinational enterprises could start investing in this region by building plants, and to provide jobs to the local community. Tax reduction and a low-tariff policy for trading goods could be incentives to bring investors into the region. Since the sun in all of the investigated countries is shining most of the time, this area is very attractive for producers of regenerative energy by building solar power plants.

Furthermore, the world is at the edge of a new industrial revolution. Digitalization will change our understanding of work and labor significantly. According to the Oxford study “The Future of Employment: how susceptible are jobs to computerization?” (Frey & Osborne 2013) by the year 2030, 50 percent of present jobs will vanish. An unconditional minimum income for everybody in the world is the only possible solution to treat that problem. The common fear of digitalization is that people will be replaced by machines and algorithms. However, this point of view undermines the great possibilities of digitalization. There are plenty of jobs, which will be, without a doubt, not missed; those jobs nobody really likes to do. The digitalization process is the opportunity to get rid of those jobs, and to free certain parts of society from unnecessary labor. The perspective has to change. Instead of thinking that robots are replacing humans and only the owners of those machines are benefiting from this change, we have to restructure the organization of our economy and the distribution of wealth. Hence, the digitalization process is a great opportunity for the poorest people of the globe, if it is done in the right way – at least in the long-run. Thus, an unconditional minimum income could be contributed to every refugee in the world, and if it is high enough, people might stay in their region and start building up a perspective in their home country, or host country. Otherwise, the brain drain effect from the poorest regions in the world will never be stopped. Indeed, well-educated people are needed in order to establish a functional infrastructure and economy. It is not desirable to bleed the Middle-East completely out by absorbing all young talented people to Europe while the rest are left behind.

In any case, a more realistic scenario for the near future is to provide more funding for the crisis regions. For instance, Germany, which was one of countries who took the most refugees in Europe, plans to increase its military expenditures by almost 50 percent in the next years (30

billion USD). This means, instead of investing in its defense, which is a very controversial topic within the German society, Germany alone could provide six times the funding for the refugee camps in Lebanon, Turkey and Jordan. Consequently, the financial resources to solve the European refugee crisis already exist (without even talking about progressive taxation, or taxation financial transactions etc.), but they are just allocated in the wrong way or inefficiently.

5. CONCLUSION

The European migration crisis can be only solved locally – in Syria and its neighbor countries. Hence, a completely different policy is necessary since it is not very likely that the civil war in Syria will end soon. The different case studies (Lebanon, Turkey, Jordan) show that refugee camps could be a possible solution, if done correctly. People need a vision of future hope and security in this region. Then, the probability is very high that they would decide to stay and not make the decision to flee to Europe. In order to accomplish this goal, refugee camps need more autonomous rights since most of the NGOs in the region fail to provide sufficient supplies of food, medicine and other necessities. Additionally, the funding of the NGOs has to be improved as well as making their infrastructures faster and more efficient. While the Turkish government has done a good job concerning the migration issue by establishing proper accommodation in form of camps, Jordan and Lebanon failed because of highly limited resources.

Another factor is that the wealthy states have to share something from their wealth in order to support the crisis region. Agreements like the 2016 Turkey deal or deals with other authoritarian regimes in the Middle-East and Africa, are very risky because the political and economic situation in these countries can change instantly. All in all, crisis management was a complete failure and it could have been easily avoided by undertaking the right measures; a more reasonable and comprehensive policy concerning the European migration crisis is required, especially providing a long-term strategy. The improvement of living conditions in refugee camps around Syria is one possible approach.

In conclusion, the European refugee crisis beginning in 2015 could have been avoided by earlier anticipation of the global community. The devastating conditions in refugee camps surrounding Syria were very well-known, but the cries for help were mostly ignored. To this day, the UNHCR is begging for funding, the amount of which is very moderate compared to the consequences of new possible mass migration movements from the Middle-East region to Europe. Indeed, funding is not everything, but the basis for every other improvement. The international community, especially Europe, which is mainly affected by refugee movements from the Middle East, have to start providing guidance and assistance in order to give people a perspective locally. This can be done, even taking soft factors like the human need for education, culture or political participation into consideration. However, the biggest issue remains the scarce resources in refugee camps.

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