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OIL DEPENDENCE, STRATEGY AND FOREIGN POLICY THE CASE OF JAPAN²

Oil became one of the most important material for economies and militaries in the 20th century. It has been affecting international relations and has been influencing foreign policies for more than a century. In my paper I would like to examine the history of Japan and its energy security related to oil. My paper tries to show how Japan has been adapting to the vulnerability of its nation from potential dangers related to oil supply. I would like to examine two case studies through which I try to show how important oil was in the Japanese economy and how it dictated foreign policy decisions in the 20th century. Furthermore, I highlight the contemporary challenges of Japan related to oil in the 21st century.

Az egyik legfontosabb energiaforrás a kőolaj lett a gazdaságok és a haderő számára a 20. században. Az elmúlt évszázadban jelentős hatást gyakorolt a nemzetközi kapcsolatokra és befolyásolta az országok különböző külpolitikai döntéseit. A publikációmban megpróbálok bemutatni az energiabiztonság szerepét Japán és a kőolaj történelmén keresztül. Japán különböző módokon próbált alkalmazkodni az ország kőolaj hiány által okozott sebezhetőségét illetően. Két esettanulmányon keresztül írásom bemutatja, mekkora szerepet játszott a kőolaj a Japán gazdaság számára, és ez milyen külpolitikai döntések meghozatalát kényszerítette ki a 20. században. Emellett, a tanulmány kiemeli milyen jelenkori kihívások elé néz az ország olajellátás terén a 21. században, és értékeli, hogy az eddigi kormányzati intézkedések milyen eredményeket hoztak.

1. INTRODUCTION

*“I have learned very little in my years, Bruce but one thing I have learned. Foreign policies of this, or any other, country are not based on right or wrong. Right or wrong? It is not for you and me to argue the right or wrong of this question. The only kingdom that runs on righteousness is the kingdom of heaven. **The kingdoms of earth run on oil**”(Uris [1983])*

This quote perfectly describes the world we have been living since the beginning of the 20th century. In the wake of the 20th century iron and coal were the cornerstones of a nation's industrial power. The conversion from coal to oil as the major source of energy made tremendous amounts of change all around the globe.

As early as 1923 some researchers are already named oil as the most important natural resource. At that time the United States produced 70% of the world's petroleum products, and it was the largest consumer as well. However, at the same time in the 1920's researchers realized

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² „The present publication is the outcome of the project „From Talent to Young Researcher project aimed at activities supporting the research career model in higher education”, identifier EFOP-3.6.3-VE-KOP-16-2017-00007 co-supported by the European Union, Hungary and the European Social Fund.”

that the oil supplies will run out in the future. A cooperation between countries was sought for efficiency, but the researches were yet to see the real power of oil. (Bedford [1923])

Oil transformed the way of life early in the 20th century, and it became one of the most crucial resource material for militaries as well. In my paper I would like to examine the history of Japan and its energy security related to oil.

Oil is important to numerous aspects of life so cutoffs in supplies or other types of disturbances are potentially very troubling for a natural resource poor country like Japan. National security concerns impact on the foreign policy of these nations related to the question of oil supply.

My paper tries to show how Japan has been adapting to the vulnerability of its nation from potential dangers related to oil supply. I would like to show two case studies through which I try to show how important oil was in the Japanese economy and how it dictated foreign policy decisions in the 20th century. Furthermore, I highlight the contemporary challenges of Japan related to oil.

2. JAPAN AND OIL DEPENDENCE IN THE 20TH CENTURY

In the early 20th century Japan's relations with the oil rich regions were disadvantageous. The USA was a rival in the Pacific region, and the Gulf region was under British dominance. Japanese products were a threat to the British influence, so the latter did not welcome Japanese exports to the region.

The importance of the Gulf region increased tremendously after oil was discovered in the Arabian Peninsula in the 1930s. Parallel to the discovery of oil, Japan and the Gulf region based their economic relations on this commodity. Meanwhile Japan was carrying out a major conquest in East Asia so its military was in dire need of this resource more than ever before. The Japanese government enacted the Petroleum Industry Law in 1934 which meant price fixing of oil and required the foreign oil companies to maintain vast reserves of oil. (British Official Wireless [1934] p. 14)

Below I try to show how oil diverted foreign policy of Japan through the help of two case studies. One of them is a pre-World War II. case: the Dutch East Indies, the other is a post-war case study, the case of the first oil crisis from 1973. These case studies demonstrate how important was oil for a militant Japan and how important was it for a pacifist one as well.

2.1. CASE STUDY I.: JAPAN AND THE DUTCH EAST INDIES IN THE FIRST HALF OF THE 20TH CENTURY

The Japanese tried to colonize the Far East region and their economic influence spread even further than their military power. For example, one of the relatively oil rich regions was the Dutch East Indies which include Sumatra, Borneo, Java, Dutch Guinea, Madura and Celebes. Today these territories are part of Indonesia. The region produced 99 percent of the world's quinine supply which is an important medicine against malaria, 50 percent of its wrapped tobacco, 20 percent of its copra and tin. However, one of the most important aspect of this region was that it produced 11 percent of the world's petroleum. In addition to petroleum in the 1930's theoretically the island had enough resources to satisfy the total demand for rubber all around the world. (Clair [1937])

The map below shows the territory of the former Dutch East Indies and their crude oil sources. As we can see especially Sarawak, Brunei and Borneo were rich in easily accessible oil reservoirs which were controlled by the Dutch and the British before the war broke out.



(GeoMark Research [2018])

Seizing the market of the Dutch East Indies the Japanese could possess valuable resources that support their conquest, and secure several important products. This peaceful “conquest” of foreign and trade policy was reflected in the import numbers of the Netherlands Indies, since the territory was not just important in terms of source for materials. It was also important to penetrate the island and build closer economic ties with Japan since the Japanese needed markets for their products as well. Furthermore, a peaceful penetration of market could bring closer the native population to Japan which could help them out in the event of a war. The native population could perceive the Japanese as liberators who fight the colonial overlords.

This task was hard to carry out for a power like Japan before the Second World War. Colonial empires showed the spheres of influence all around the globe and the Dutch East Indies were no different in that matter. Japan’s share of import in the 1909-1913 period was only 1.25 percent, which was virtually non-existent. (Clair 1937]). Japan tried to secure the region and bring it closer to its empire, which is reflected in the import numbers of the region related to Japan and the Netherlands.

	1928	1929	1930	1931	1932	1933	1934
NETHERLANDS	20.05	19.62	18.92	17.44	15.76	12.37	12.98
JAPAN	9.54	10.55	11.68	21.24	21.24	31.03	31.88

(Clair [1937])

The importance of oil rich regions such as the Dutch East Indies showed during the coming years. As early as August 1941, the British who controlled the islands with the Dutch implemented a scheme that reduced the oil output by 70 per cent. In the light of the attack on Pearl Harbor the British ordered the total destruction of oil fields and air fields. (Hackett [2018])

They knew that after Japan entered the war openly, they would very much likely capture this region for their war aims, especially because of its oil richness. After just several days of the attack on Pearl Harbor the Japanese landed on the island on 16th December 1941 to capture the oil fields and refineries. The Dutch tried to sabotage the future of Japanese oil production by destroying several hundred oil wells. In spite of their effort the refineries on Borneo supplied Japan with approximately 35 per cent of its petroleum products during the war. [Hackett [2018])

At the beginning of the war, the United States tried to avoid the armed confrontation as in the case of the First World War. However, the Japanese carried out hostile moves during the 1930s and early 1940s that raised the tension between the two countries. The United States was a major player in terms of oil production; it controlled 60 percent of it in the beginning of the war. The second and third most important producer at the time was Russia and Venezuela. Japan heavily relied on the US oil shipments. (Yergin [1991])

JAPAN'S DEPENDENCE ON OIL IMPORT IN 1940

COUNTRY FROM	AMOUNT	PERCENTAGE
United States of America	Btw 3,820 – 4,366 kt	80
Dutch East Indies	Btw 621 – 709 kt	13

(Arima [2003])

Japan knew that certain military moves would cause retaliatory actions from the United States even before the US and Japan entered into direct military conflict. The easiest way of pressuring Japan and slowing down its military actions was to decrease the oil exports to Japan from the United States. In order to counter these measures Japan began to stockpile oil prior to the sanctions, but was unable to secure a large enough supply. (Yergin [1991])

JAPANESE OIL INVENTORIES IN THOUSANDS OF BARRELS

FISCAL YEAR	CRUDE PETROLEUM			REFINED PRODUCTS			STARTING INVENTORIES			CONSUMPTION
	Imports	Production	Total	Imports	Production	Total	Imports	Production	Total	
1941	3,130	1,941	5,071	5,242	15,997	21,239	20,857	28,036	48,893	36,974
1942	8,146	1,690	9,836	2,378	16,674	19,052	12,346	25,883	38,229	41,790
1943	9,848	1,814	11,662	4,652	16,167	20,819	6,839	18,488	25,327	43,992
1944	1,641	1,585	3,226	3,334	9,615	12,949	2,354	11,462	13,816	25,045
1945 (FIRST HALF)	0	809	809	0	1,933	1,933	195	4,751	4,946	~6,576

(Budge [2016])

The dire fuel situation of the Imperial Navy diverted strategy not just in the case of the Dutch East Indies. Japan needed to win big decisive battles instead of a prolonged war. The Battle of Leyte Gulf off the Philippines in 1944 October is a prime example how the Japanese were handicapped again and again in the three day battle thanks to lacking oil supplies. The Imperial Navy lost three battleships, ten cruisers and thirteen destroyers. The fuel shortages forced the Japanese to use Kamikaze pilots because they only required half the fuel compared to a traditional aircraft due to the fact that there was no return trip. While the Japanese suffered from the shortages, the United States as a top oil producer used six times as much oil as the Japanese. Instead of admitting defeat to the more and more successful Americans, Japan made desperate efforts to produce fuel. Pine roots were dug up to produce crude oil substitute. It is a highly inefficient and very labor intensive process that could only produce 75,000 barrels per month by June 1945. In addition to that, it is very damaging for the environment. (e-education.psu.edu [2019])

The case of the Dutch East Indies shows us, how Japan modified its military campaign and gave major significance to the territory thanks to its large oil reserve and refinery capacities. Less than ten days after the attack on Pearl Harbor, the Japanese military was already on the island to capture the valuable facilities. The importance of refined oil products are national security concerns, especially for countries that have poor oil sources like Japan. These products are necessary for transportation, which is one of the key factors of war. Without the necessary means of reallocating resources, military equipment and personal, a war cannot be won.

It was especially true for the Pacific theatre of the Second World War. Far away territories had to be defended or attacked, and without oil, serious logistical challenges could cause problems for the military high command. The British did not defend the Dutch East Indies because of their logistical problems, and because their main concern was not Japan, but rather Nazi Germany which seemed the most powerful foe in the beginning of the 1940s. However, the Dutch and the British knew that the main value of the region was its richness in oil, so they tried to sabotage the Japanese efforts to use its capacities. The main goal was not to let Japan use the oil resources of the island instead of holding the territory against the invaders. This shows that oil was more important than any other factor related to this territory during the war. Without this territory Japan could have been in even more trouble and lose the war sooner.

2.2. CASE STUDY II.: JAPAN AND THE OIL CRISIS OF 1973

The Japanese economy experienced rapid development during the war years. Between 1937 and 1945, production indices showed tremendous increases for example: 252 percent in machinery, 70 percent in nonferrous metals, 46 percent in steel and almost a quarter: 24 percent in manufacturing.

After the war the militarized economy had to be converted to peacetime activities. Fortunately, the Japanese economy was diverse and sophisticated enough to make this conversion relatively easily. For example in the automobile industry, out of the 11 major auto manufacturers in post-war Japan, 10 was operational during the war years. It was only Honda which is an entirely new product of the post-war period. Three major ones: Toyota, Nissan, and Isuzu were the primary producers of trucks for the military. It was thanks to a 1936 law that had driven out Ford and General Motors out of the Japanese market. As we could see Japan foreshadowed the conflict with the United States and wanted to be self-sufficient in terms of military equipment. Other corporate giants gained comparable competitive advantage during the war years, and they brought their advantage to the coming years after 1945 as well. Whole sectors such as Normura Securities in bonds and stocks, Hitachi in electrical equipment manufacturing and Toshiba in electric goods were able to take off in the post-war period by building on advantages and fortunes made during the war. (Dower [1992] pp.54-55).

After 1945, many of the wartime companies and much of the technology used before and during the war were converted to peaceful economic tools. Japanese private companies expanded quickly and ambitiously. They borrowed massive amounts of money from banks and took on large debts.

The Japanese Government advised the private companies to do mergers that make them more effective against the American "Detroit's Big Three which refers to General Motors, Ford and Fiat

Chrysler. However instead of doing that the private companies developed rapidly, against the conservative advice of the government. Toyota, Nissan, Isuzu, Toyo Kogyo (Mazda), and Mitsubishi all decided to produce full lines of automobiles. These types of industries required a large amount of petroleum products so the coming oil crisis was especially threatening to the country. Many companies went against the intentions of the government. For example a motorcycle company founded by Honda Soichiro defied bureaucratic warnings and entered the auto market in 1963 with great success. In 1953, Morita Akio and Ibuka Masaru, struggled for months with reluctant state officials before winning permission to purchase a license to make transistors. Beginning with the radio in the 1950s, their infant company, Sony, soon emerged as the global leader in quality and innovation in consumer electronics goods. (Gordon [2003] pp. 248-49)

This shows that regardless of government efforts the economy of Japan was transformed to a capitalist one, which means that the foreign and trade policy of post-war Japan was no longer solely determined by the government. Previously as we could see during the war years, several companies were built up to match the requirement of the government. After the war, a great number of private companies achieved remarkable success thanks to their own efforts and capabilities to thrive on the market. The post-war Japan has never been able to extort its will on the private sector as much as before.

It is important in our case because in terms of securing oil resources the government played a much more supportive role than before. Prior to the war, Japan could reallocate the crucial resources to its most important companies, now these companies could make private contracts with suppliers. It has been also feasible because after the Second World War the colonial and Mandate System crumbled and as time went by slowly, but surely sovereign new states were born, which were eager to trade with the highest bidder. The colonial overlords could not divert trade as before. And as we could see in the case of the Dutch East Indies, the proximity of Japan to these resources meant that without the colonial rulers Japan could more easily secure oil supplies from these regions.

Nationalism and the desire to catch up with the West was the dominant way of thinking after the Second World War, but after the defeat, efforts were focused on economic and industrial goals rather than on military achievements. Good example for this conversion is that machine gun factories after the war were converted to make sewing machines; optical weapons factories produced cameras and binoculars. (Pyle [1996] p. 242)

Japan after the Second World War became one of the most devastated countries on Earth. Its development took off largely because the United States realized that it needed a strong ally in the Pacific region and Mao's China and the Korean War made it necessary to handle Japan as an ally instead of a former enemy. Losing this country to the Eastern block or it joining the Non-Aligned Nation's movement would have seriously weakened the position of the United States in the Far Eastern and Pacific region.

In terms of oil dependency, the positions of post-war Japan have changed. The country was still in dire need of oil resources, because major oil reservoirs were not discovered on the Japanese islands. There was however a shift in the resources and supply security of the Japanese economy. The Western powers which still had influence in oil rich regions (regardless of decolonization tendencies) were now the allies of Japan, and the United States a former formidable foe, was a major supporter of Japan's development, especially after the Korean War broke out. Japan no longer needed to conquer territories or clash with the Western powers in order to secure its

oil supplies. This meant that the foreign and trade policy of Japan could focus on other important things, such as the rebuilding the economy without worrying about supply shortages up until the 1970s when oil crises shook the world.

The first oil crisis in 1973 was triggered by the war in the Middle East. Major oil producers in the region were fed up with the West that helped their enemy: Israel. Six of them (Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Iran, Kuwait, Abu Dhabi and Qatar) decided that in order to retaliate against the West and show power, they will raise the price of oil by 21% immediately. Furthermore, the OPEC countries agreed to decrease production of oil by 5% every month for a certain amount of time. In addition to that, Libya, Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries implemented an oil embargo against the United States. In light of the event Exxon and Shell announced a 30% increase in their oil price thanks to the coming change in supply and demand, which policy was followed by the Majors (major oil producers) soon. In addition to that the Arabian countries did not consider Japan as a neutral nation connected to their struggle, so they cut the supply of Arabia Oil Co. Ltd. (a significant supplier of Japan) by 10%. The Majors also decreased their export to Japan by 10%. (Yamakoshi [1986])

As the table below shows, Japan was significantly dependent on the oil from the Gulf region. The country was considered to be a friendly nation to the West and Israel, that is why the political measures from the Arabian countries were so severe.

STRUCTURE OF ENERGY DEPENDENCE OF MAJOR INDUSTRIAL COUNTRIES

	- 1978, % -								
	Japan	West Germany	United Kingdom	France	Italy	Canada	USA	OECD	
DEPENDENCE ON OIL FOR ENERGY	73.5	54.7	64.1	59.9	70.3	39.7	48.9	53.4	
DEPENDENCE ON IMPORTS FOR OIL	99.8	96.6	43.4	99.0	98.5	12.9	45.7	65.9	
DEPENDENCE ON THE MIDDLE EAST FOR OIL IMPORTS	78.5	48.9	80.6	76.9	68.5	44.7	38.5	68.6	
DEPENDENCE ON THE MIDDLE EAST FOR ENERGY	57.6	25.8	16.5	45.6	47.3	2.3	18.6	24.1	

(Economic Planning Agency [1980])

The Japanese foreign policy was in a dilemma. On the one hand its relationship with the United States was one of the highest importance. On the other hand, the relations with the Arabian countries had to be restored in order to ease the pressure on the Japanese economy. Several internal successful economic policy reforms were carried out thanks to the crisis, but carrying out external policies could not be missed in order to handle the crisis.

The Ministry of International Trade and Industry which was a very influential and successful governmental body analyzed the situation. The country had to divert its foreign policy from fully supporting the United States by taking a more pro-Arab stance. The Majors would not back Japan and a more severe situation could occur if Japan continue to show its support towards Israel.

Then Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka met with U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger to discuss the situation before Japan took any further steps. Kissinger could not promise to compensate the oil shortages of Japan, so the Japanese Government's hands were tied. In spite of the fact that Jewish-American businessmen might retaliate and view the stance of Japan unfriendly, the country had to loosen its ties to the United States by making a pro-Arab statement. It was estimated that the Japanese economic growth could decrease from 10.7% to below 5% if its oil supply would decrease by 5-6%. (Yamakoshi [1986])

As early as 22nd November 1973 the Japanese Government sought to stabilize the situation with the Arabian countries by issuing a statement where Japan expressed its intentions of reconsidering its policy towards Israel if it did not withdraw from territories occupied by the Jewish State since 1967. Furthermore, Japan reiterated that it supports the United Nations Security Council Resolution 242 which was accepted unanimously in 1967 regarding the situation in the Middle East, and was more favorable towards the Arab countries rather than to Israel. (Halloran [1973])

In addition to the statements by the Japanese government, Vice Prime Minister Miki was sent to Arabian countries to restore good relations, which resulted in recognizing Japan by the Oil Ministers Conference of OAPEC (United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Kuwait, Qatar, Syria, Iran and Iraq) as a friendly nation. (Yamakoshi [1986])

This way Japan diverted its foreign policy in order to counter the embargo which would have been devastating if it lasted for a longer period. Japan focused its economy and its diplomacy towards energy security which I detail in the chapter below.

3. CONTEMPORARY JAPANESE FOREIGN POLICY CHALLENGES CONNECTED TO OIL

The geopolitical situation of Japan has not change since the end of the Second World War. Its access to resources depends mainly on marine transportation. Therefore freedom of navigation and overflight is a key issue for Japan. The most troublesome region that concerns the Japanese foreign policy connected to the security of sea lanes is the South China Sea. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan [2017]) China's claims of sovereignty over the South China Sea concerns not only Japan, but Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan and Vietnam. Japan could benefit from the sea's estimated 11 billion barrels of untapped oil and 190 cubic feet of natural gas, but Chinese attempts bring uncertainty and tension to the region. (Council on Foreign Relations [2019])

Japan can rely on the United States to counter the disturbance of open sea lanes, however the issue of the South China Sea remains one of the focal points of the Japanese foreign policy in the coming decades which can cause disturbances in the oil supply of the country. Naval blockades, increased tensions and uncertainty could threaten oil tankers which could increase the price of oil. This could pose a threat to the Japanese economy therefore the foreign policy of the country has to increase its efforts to keep the sea lanes safe and open.

Another focal point of the Japanese foreign policy is the prolonged uncertainty of the Middle East. The region is an important energy supplier of the world including Japan and the unstable governments with international terrorist organizations pose a potential threat to the energy security of the country. Japan made serious efforts to secure stable supply of resources and food. It hosted as the presidency of the G7 the Meeting of the Energy Charter Conference in 2016 October (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan [2017]) This shows how central the question of energy dependence is in the country.

Japan's oil import dependence stood at 99.7% and it was the fourth largest oil consumer in the world with 4.037 million barrels per day) in 2016. (BP [2017]) The country's primary supplier remains the Middle East as in the past. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates supply more than half of its total energy imports alone, which explains the focus on the Middle East. (METI [2017])

The Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) have been trying to implement three types of policy measures in order to increase the oil security of the country since the 1960s:

1. Increase the self-development ratio (SDR) of oil, which is a ratio between total oil imports of Japan and total yearly oil production by Japanese companies. This effort mainly involves financial support for overseas explorations of Japanese companies.
2. Vertical and horizontal integration in the Japanese oil industry is encouraged to increase competitiveness and bargaining power.
3. Development of resource diplomacy aimed at enhancing economic interdependence between Japan and oil-producing countries especially with Middle Eastern countries. (Thorarinsson [2018] p. 5)

SELF-DEVELOPMENT RATIO OF OIL TARGETS AND RESULTS

TARGET SET	OIL SELF-DEVELOPMENT TARGET	TARGET DATE	RESULTS
1965	30% of total import of 881 million barrels/year	1985	10.7% 133 million barrels/year
1967	30% of total imports	1985	10.7%
1978	1.5 Mb/d	1990	0.45 Mb/d
1983	1.2 Mb/d	1995	0.69 Mb/d
1993	1.2 Mb/d	At the beginning of the 21 st century	0.58 Mb/d
2000	Cancellation of numeric target		
2006	40% of oil imports	2030	
2008	40% of oil and gas imports	2030	27.4% in April 2006

Thorarinsson [2018] p. 18)

These countermeasures have been producing mixed results. The decades long programs show some improvement in different areas, but the dependency of Japan essentially remained the same. The SDR of oil increased from 10% in 1973 to 15% in 2008. In order to cover the poor numbers the METI publishes SDR of oil and natural gas jointly since 2009, but in the last decade only a slow improvement was carried out. The integration of the Japanese oil industry only dates back to the 1990s, but the upstream-downstream divide is still present. However, the number of downstream corporate groups decreased from 17 to 4 since the 1970s. The success of the resource diplomacy is even harder to assess. The ties between Japan and the United States, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates is stronger than in the past thanks to the Japanese efforts. As I mentioned before Saudi Arabia and the UAE supplies the vast majority of oil to Japan, therefore a closer relationship can be expected with these countries at the expense of other oil producers. (Thorarinsson [2018] p. 6)

CONCLUSION

The two case studies clearly show how a resource poor country such as Japan had to modify its foreign policy decisions. Petroleum products and oil was an important part both for the wartime and peacetime economies. The case of the Dutch East Indies shows, how the Japanese

government meant to attach the Dutch and nearby British colonies to its sphere of influence by economic means. It was faced serious opposition by the European colonial powers. That is the reason why within ten days after Japan openly entered the war, its invasion forces was already on the Island of Borneo to secure the region's rich oil supplies. The territory proved to be a very important supplier of Japan during the war. However, it could not provide enough material for Japan to match the capabilities of the United States.

After the defeat of Japan, its economy had to recover. It meant that Japanese firms enjoyed the advantages given by the Western block. The United States' interest was to see Japan thrive, but it could not shield the country from oil shortages in the event of the first oil crisis. The Japanese foreign policy had to distance itself from the United States regarding the issue of Israel in order to restore its ties to the most important oil producing region of the world. Public statements and high level visits were carried out by the Japanese government in order to earn the goodwill of the Middle Eastern oil producing countries, which would have certainly not happened if the region was not a major supplier of oil for Japan.

As the internal measures taken by the Japanese government (increased SDR, integration of the oil industry) show relatively weak results, the Japanese foreign policy had to introduce resource diplomacy as a way to effectively counter supply shortages. The relations of Japan with oil producing countries has been improving for decades. This shows how the foreign policy decisions of Japan was greatly influenced by oil in the 20th century. In my opinion, energy diversification could only ease this pressure, but cannot eliminate it in the 21st century either.

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